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This thesis describes an experimental analysis of the impact of
transient faults on a microprocessor-based jet-engine controller, used in
the Boeing 747 and 757 aircrafts. A hierarchical simulation environ-
ment which allows the injection of transients during run-time and the
tracing of their impact is described. Verification of the accuracy of this
approach is also provided. A determination of the probability that a
transient results in latch, pin or functional errors is made. Given a tran-
sient fault, there is approximately an 80% chance that there is no impact
on the chip. An empirical model to depict the process of error explo-
sion and degeneration in the target system is derived. The model shows
that, if no latch-errors occur within 8 clock cycles, no significant dam-
age is likely to happen. Thus, the overall impact of a transient is well
contained. A state transition model is also derived from the measured
data, to describe the error propagation characteristics within the chip,
and to quantify the impact of transients on the external environment.
The model is used to identify and isolate the critical fault propagation
paths, the module most sensitive to fault propagation and the module
with the highest potential of causing external pin-errors.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in the use of digital systems
to control critical avionic functions. Naturally, this has led to valid concerns
regarding the dependability of these systems. A particular source of concern is
the impact of transients which are rather common in avionic environments. This
is especially so since past measurements [1],[2] show that over 80 percent of all
computer system failures can be attributed to transients.
This thesis describes an experimental analysis of the impact of transient
faults in a microprocessor-based jet-engine controller used in the Boeing 747 and
757 aircrafts. A hierarchical simulation environment for the run-time injection of
transients and for the tracing of their impact is described. A determination of the
probability that a transient results in latch, pin or functional errors is made.
Given a transient fault, there is approximately an 80 percent chance that there is
no impact on the chip. The probability of a latch error is over 20 percent, while
that of a pin error is approximately 12 percent.
t
An empirical model to depict the process of error explosion and degenera-
tion in the target system is derived. The model shows that, if no latch errors
occur within 8 clock cycles, no significant damage is likely to happen. Thus, the
overall impact of a transient is well contained. A state transition model is
t T
2derived from the measured data to describe the error propagation characteristics
within the chip and to quantify the impact of transients on the chip's external
environment. The model is used to identify and isolate the critical fault propaga-
tion paths, the module most sensitive to fault propagation and the module with
the highest potential of causing external pin-errors.
1.1. Related Research J
Several researchers have investigated the impact of transients in computer
systems. An early study of the effects and detection of failures in digital systems
reported in [1] showed that nearly 90 percent of failures were transient in nature.
Recent studies using failure data from IBM mainframes reported in [2] also
showed that nearly 85 percent of major system errors were transient in nature.
Furthermore, a strong relationship was found between the occurrence of tran-
sients and the level of system activity.
Device-level analysis of the mechanisms of transient upset has been in pro-
gress for quite some time. The hazards of transient upset in dynamic RAMs was
first reported in [3] where the behavior of alpha-particle induced soft errors was
explored. Simulation techniques for modeling the device-level effects of cosmic
particle induced transients were developed in [4] and [5]. Reference [4] used a
SPICE circuit with a current source to represent collected charges generated by
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alpha particles. In [5], a simulation technique for modeling the ion shunt effect
was developed. An approximate analytic solution which models a current tran-
sient was developed in [6]. The model includes parameters which represent the
maximum current, the collection time constant of the junction, and the time con-
stant for initially establishing the ion track. The analytic solution was validated
by comparison with other computer models and is used in this study.
A series of experiments, aimed at error analysis through the physical inser-
tion of faults, was conducted by several investigators at the NASA AIRLAB test
bed facility. An experiment to study fault latency distributions through hardware
fault injections is described in [7] and [8]. Information gathered from these stu-
dies shows that the data generated can provide considerable insight into error
manifestation. Another useful study is [9] which describes a simulation experi-
ment to determine the efficiency of a number of error-detection mechanisms. In
[10], an approach to expose upsets in a computer system by abstraction
verification is described. More recently in [11], physical fault injection was used
to validate a computerized interlocking system for the French railways.
At the microprocessor level, studies have primarily focused on vulnerability
assessment and software detection methods. An assessment of difterent transient
error test methods is presented in [12]. In [13], a detailed analysis of the vulner-
ability of the ZS0 microprocessor based on ion bombardment testing is described.
I4
The data obtained are based on a technique which associates upsets with the
machine cycle during which the errors first appear on the pins. Studies have also
focused on the efficiency of the methods for software detection of transient faults.
An approach which involves the development of a state transition matrix to
describe the response to transient faults is described in [14]. In [15], transient
faults which result in steady-state failures are analyzed and detection methods are
presented.
An investigation of fault propagation in microprocessors was conducted in
[16]. An experimental analysis to study error propagation from the gate to the
pin-level, for stuck-at faults, was described. The target system was a Bendix
BDX-930 digital avionic miniprocessor. The analysis quantified the dependency
of the measured error propagation on the location of the fault and the type of
instruction/micro-instruction activity. The investigation presented a methodology
for quantifying error propagation from the gate to pins for stuck-at faults. In
[17], new experiments to study fault and error latencies under varying workload
conditions are discussed.
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An important question not addressed in the above studies is the propagation
of transients from the device-level through the microprocessor functional units
and pins. Apart from furthering the knowledge of transient fault propagation in
microprocessors, this information is crucial for further defining the vulnerability
u_
ow
IL_
of microprocessors to transients.
the impact of transients from the device to the pin-level was described.
sients with charge-levels of 0.5, 1, 2, 3 and 4 picocoulombs were injected.
5
In [18], a preliminary experiment to quantify
Tran-
Logic
upsets and first-order latch and pin errors were measured and analyzed via
analysis of variance methods.
The above results point toward the need for more complete analysis of fault
propagation characteristics. The type of functional-errors which can result from
the injected transients needs to be determined. Such errors can result in serious
system malfunction, especially in avionic systems. In order to isolate the critical
paths in the circuit, the fault propagation between the functional units and to the
external pins must be quantified. In particular, the mechanisms involved in inter-
nal propagation of latch errors (i.e., transient fault latency) and their effect at the
pin-level need to be investigated and modeled.
r ,
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CHAPTER 2.
TARGET SYSTEM
m
The target system for this study is a microprocessor used for real-time con-
trol of jet-engine functions. The system is currently used in commercial aircraft,
including the BOEING-747 and the 757. The controller (EEC131, manufactured
by Hamilton Standard) has two channels; the processing elements of both chan-
nels are identical. The system has a real-time re.configuration mechanism
wherein the lead channel stops its usual operation on detecting a fault and
transfers control to the dual. The system incorporates a variety of fault-tolerant
design features at different levels including software checks, parity checks,
memory test and error counting.
The control system samples engine parameters such as the fuel flow, the
temperature, the engine speed and other external inputs such as air speed and
positional parameters. The sampled parameters are digitized and updated into the
RAM approximately every millisecond for further processing. The controller
also reads pilot inputs (from the throttle and various switches) into a RAM work
area and calculates the desired control functions. The calculated functions are
used to drive display indicators and to control the engine. The equations describ-
ing the control functions are programmed in the application code which resides in
EPROMs.
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The control system architecture thus contains microprocessors, memory
units, I/O gate array chips, communication channels, frequency samplers, A/D
converters and D/A converters. In this experiment, the microprocessor and its
associated memory were simulated with a focus on the impact of transient errors.
The 16-bit HS1602 microprocessor (Figure 1), which is the heart of the con-
troller, consists of six major functional units. The arithmetic and logic unit
(ALU), which contains six registers, can perform double precision arithmetic
operations. The control unit, which is responsible for issuing signals to control
the operations of the ALU, is made up of combinational logic and several regis-
Countdown
I/O
Memory
Decode
Statue
Figure 1: Data Flow Diagram of HS 1602.
w
w
8ters. The decoder unit decodes I/O signals, the multiplexer unit provides the
discrete lines and buses, and the countdown unit is used to drive chip-wide clock
signals. The watchdog unit provides protection against fault by resetting the pro-
cessor in the event of parity error or when the application software is timed out
by the software sanity timer. The signal to synchronize the dual system is also
provided by this unit. The chip runs at 6 MHz and is implemented in a 3-micron
technology CMOS gate-array made of 2688 blocks of 4 N-channel and 4 P-
channel transistors.
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THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
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3.1. Simulation Environment
In order to perform fast and accurate analysis, a mixed-mode transient fault
simulator [18] based on SPLICE1 [19]: was used. The simulator provides a fault
injection and analysis environment which uses the SPLICEi relaxation algorithm
for circuit analysis. Transients can be injected without explicit modification of
the circuit description. A transient injection is equivalent to a run-time
modification of the circuit whereby a current source is added to the target-node, 2
thus altering the voltage level of the node over the time interval of the injected
current waveform. The method allows both single and multiple transient injec-
tions. Since the injected current source is specified in a mathematical functional
form, the transients can be of varying shapes and duration. Details of the imple-
mentation are given in [18].
For a comprehensive study of fault propagation in the microprocessor, a
tracing facility was also developed to monitor all of the internal nodes (over
ITbe electrical analysis in SPLICE1 is based on the method of Iterated Timing Analysis (rl'A), which been shown to be as
accurate as SPICE2 in [20] and c_m provide a speed-up to two orders of magnitude. The logic analysis in SPI.JCEI is performed
using • relaxation-based method that uses MOS oriented models. Virtually unlimited levels of sisnal strensth can be associated with
each of the logic values in order to further enhance accuracy. This •pptoach allows • eorrespondance between the electrical output
c.cnductance and the logic output stnmgth. By using • fanout-dependent delay-model, which is capable of handling tint-order
effects, accurate delay-handling is achieved.
2A node is defined as • point in • conductive interconnection between elex_eal and/or logical dements.
w
10
4000) in the HS 1602. The tracing facility is capable of monitoring each node for
all processed events. The trace data for each event consist of the time of the
event, the hierarchical node name and the new and previous voltage levels (for
electrical nodes) or the new and previous logic levels and their strengths (for
logic nodes).
tl1
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3.2. Graphics Analysis Facility Ill
A graphics analysis facility was developed (on a color SUN Workstation) to
visualize the error activity in different functional units of the processor and the
fault propagation on the major interconnects and at the external pins. The key
features include:
m!
W
lip
1). A visual display of the impact of an injected transient.
2).
3).
/
The generation of selected muitiVadable statistical distributions to quantify
the internal and external fault propagations due to transients.
The generation of a multistep fault propagation model to quantify the impact
of transient fault latency.
U
Ul¢ •
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In addition, the regions of increasing latch error occurrences are identified by
their color. The interconnects through which the faults _0pagate are also
highlighted. A sample of the graphical display is shown in Figure 2: (a) func-
tional units, (b) the major interconnections, (c) the external pins, (d) error
m
I --
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( (C) GRAPHICAL TRANSIENT ANALYSIS
_
_U Figure 2: Display of Graphical Program.
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sensitivity color code, (e) the derived fault propagation model and (f) statistical
distributions. In the usual case, the preprocessed error data from the fault simu-
lations form the input to the graphical program. This allows accelerated viewing
of the impact of the injected transient. The propagation path of an injected tran-
sient is traced on screen by a red "blip" through various internal modules and
external pins. The fault sensitive functional unit (originally represented in blue)
gradually becomes yellow, then red. After each injection/simulation run, the sta-
tistical distributions of the latch and pin error characteristics and the fault
=
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propagation can be calculated and displayed. This process can also be done in
real-time when graphical analysis is directly interfaced with the fault simulator. I
3.3. The Experiment
In this experiment, the entire HS1602 was simulated along with its associ-
ated memory modules. In the simulations, the gates around the region of fault
injection were simulated at the electrical level and the rest of the processor was
simulated at the logical level. The memory modules, which were not subject to
fault injection, were simulated at the functional level. The actual design parame-
ters of HS 1602 and the capacitances extracted from the circuit layout were used
in the simulations. The initialization phase of the microprocessor, which consists
of a watchdog test, a parity test, an instruction set test, a RAM test and a ROM
sum test and ensures that all of the functional units are exercised, was simulated.
The simulation includes the processor accessing one external ROM for instruc-
tions and another external ROM for the initialization parameters. Arithmetic pro-
cessing and address generation are also performed.
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In the experiment, transients with charge levels in the range 0.5 to 9.0
picocoulombs 3 were injected at seven randomly chosen nodes in each one of the
six major functional units. Each charge level was injected at five different time
_e-_ C_ _t tn,_i_t ren,o,_ of _,,.i_, hew io,,, in,:au_g 100McV_"F_ i_, which,,_
commonly found in the conic environment ['21]. These levels were chosen so as to ensure that no permanent errors occur. Charge
levels approximately greater th_ 10 picoeoulombs are known to cause permanent law.h-tips (device failing) in reference [22].
J
m
M
W
W
w13
w
points during the execution of the application code sequence. The specific
waveforms used in the fault simulations follow the double-exponential function
proposed m [6]
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I(t) = _ [e-'/°- e-'_]
where _ is the approximate maximum current, ct is the collection time-constant
for junction and 13is the ion track establishment time-constant.
The error data for the analysis were generated by comparing each faulted
simulation with a fault-free simulation. An error was assumed to occur if the
injected transient caused the node voltage to vary beyond a defined logic thresh-
old. For each simulation, the recorded data included the time of fault occurrence,
the location of fault, the faulted value, and the fault-free value. Each fault event
was also classified as either a timing error (premature or late firing) or a value
error.
The error data were then processed by a series of programs that collected
statistics on the fault injections which resulted in a voltage transient large enough
to result in latch and pin errors and errors at the interconnections of the func-
tional units.
Statistics on errors resulting in a functional alteration of the processor func-
tions were also collected. The collected statistics were classified by the charge
14
level and by the location.. In total, over 2100 fault injections/simulations have
been performed.
u
g
3.4. Validation of The Mixed-Mode Transient Simulator
Recall that in this experiment a region around the injected node was simu-
lated at the electrical level and the rest of the circuit at the logic level. In using
such mixed-mode simulations, the question of the accuracy of the signal transfer
between the electrical level and the logic level analysis needs to be addressed.
For a transient-induced voltage in the digital circuit to stabilize, a signal must
travel through a sufficient distance in the circuit. An experirnent was conducted
in order to determine the minimum size of this gate distance. 4
In order to determine the correct gate distance that must be simulated at the
electrical level, a 9 picocoulomb transient was injected into a randomly selected
node. Initially, all gates within five gate distances from the target node were
simulated at the electrical level. Next, the same injection was made with all
gates within four gate distances from the target node, simulated at the electrical
level. A logic comparison was made to verify the consistency between these two
simulation results. Similar injections were performed with 3, 2 and 1 gate
distance(s) simulated at the electrical level and again the logic comparisons were
*l'he gate distance is defined as the number of levels of gates between two nodes in the circuit.
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injection locations. Again, analysis of the simulation results with different gate
distances, simulated at the electrical level, was performed. Table 1 summarizes
these results. For example, for combinational circuits, with a charge level of 7
picocoulombs, at least three gate distances from the point of injection need to be
simulated at the electrical level for accurate results. In general, for combinational
circuits, up to three gate distances from the injection point are need to be simu-
lated at the electrical level. Transients occurring near latches require up to four
gate distances to be simulated at the electrical-level analysis.
Table 1" Accuracy Experiment Results.
I
r_
Minimum Gate Distance Needed in Electrical Level Analysis
Charge Level
1 picocoulombs
3 picocoulombs
5 picocoulombs
7 picocoulombs
9 picocoulombs
Combinational
Circuit
1
2
2
3
3
Latch Distance (Gate Distance)
1 2 3 4 5
2 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 2 2
3 3 2 2 2
3 4 4 3 3
3 4 4 3 3
17
CHAPTER 4.
IMPACT OF TRANSIENTS
m
m
m
Table 2 summarizes the overall impact of transients in the range 0.5 to 9.0
picocoulombs. In the table, a first-order error is defined as one which occurs dur-
ing the first clock cycle following a transient fault injection; second- and higher-
order errors are those occurring during the second and subsequent clock cycles. 6
The second column shows the number of fault injections which result in errors.
The third column shows the total number of the resultant errors. For example,
out of 2100 fault injections, one or more first-order latch errors occurred in 470
cases (22.4 percent), and a total of 2149 latch errors were observed.
Table 2: Impact of Transients
Transient Fault Severity
Type Occurrenc_ Total Envr Cotmt Percentage
tm
u
gll
u
u
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Injected Transients 2100
F'trst-Order Latch Errors 470
Second-mad Higher-Order Latch Errors 120
First-Order Pin Errors 255
Second-mad Higher-Order Pin Errors 90
Functional Errors 193
100%
2149 22.4%
1829 5.7%
1168 12.1%
839 4.3%
747 9.2%
I
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eTramient_ modeled in the experiment last no longeT than one dock cycle. Thus, no latch error can occur from
propagation after the tint clock cycle. This is typical of effectJ of comd¢ rays and the like.
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A number of issues relating to the fault sensitivity of the chip are
highlighted by these data. First, they show that over 20 percent of the injections
result in latch errors. Given that a transient results in a latch error, the chance of
multiple errors is high (an average of 4 latch errors per transient). The existence
of such multiple latch errors is potentially a serious problem since these errors
can subsequently propagate to the pins and lead to multiple failures.
In addition, even though only 25 percent (120 out of 470) of the latch errors
propagated past the first clock clycle (i.e., the first-order), each such propagation
can result, on the average, in about 15 latch errors, thus further intensifying the
propagation problem. An effect of second- and higher-order latch errors is an
increase in the probability of functional errors (erroneous control signals or data,
which result in an alteration of the microprocessor functions).
There is almost a 10 percent chance of having functional errors. Over one-
third of the total number of functional errors were due to transients in the ALU
unit. Further analysis of the error data showed that a significant number of func-
tional errors due to transients in the ALU unit were due to first-order effects.
This is because transients that latch directly on the ALU registers result in
an immediate alteration of address or data information. Functional errors caused
by second- and higher-order effects of transients were more dispersed among
different functional units. A relationship between the second- and higher-order
=
r
19
latch errors and functional errors is discussed further in Section 5.1.
From Table 2, the percentage of first-order pin error occurrences is
significant (over 10 percen0. Given a pin error, the chance of recurrence during
the subsequent clock cycles is relatively high (90/255) and each propagation can
result, on the average, in approximately 9 pin-errors (in comparison, there are
approximately 4 pin errors resulting from the first-order propagation).
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4.1. Charge Level Analysis
This section quantifies the impact on the chip of the charge level in a tran-
sient. Statistical analysis of the the error data was performed to determine the
effect of different charge levels in the injected transients on the severity of latch,
pin and functional errors. Figure 4 shows the frequency of latch, pin and
I00
80
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20
0
....... First Level Latched Error
.............. First Level Pin Error
Functional Error
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Figure 4: Error Frequency by Charge Level.
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functional errors as a function of the charge level in the injected transient. First,
note that beyond 7 picocoulombs, the number of error occurrences remains rela-
tively constant, i.e., additional charge does not result in an increase in the error
probability. This is because, at this charge level, essentially all the latches in the
propagation path have been affected (i.e., hold erroneous values).
For latch and pin errors there is a charge threshold of 2 picocoulombs, at
which a sharp increase in error activity occurs. Over 95 percent of the latch
errors occurred at charge levels greater than 2 picocoulombs and 100 percent of
the pin errors were observed for charges at or above 2 picocoulombs. For func-
tional errors, however, the threshold is not so well defined.
This is most likely due to the fact that functional errors can also result from
second- and higher-order latch errors (in addition to being caused by the first-
order effect of a transient). The higher-order effects, of course, are not charge
dependent, hence a charge threshold does not occur. Figure 5 shows the fre-
quency of second- and higher-order latch errors and the functional upsets. Note
that the frequency of the second and higher order latch errors also lacks the dis-
tinctive charge threshold.
Figure 6 shows, for each functional unit, the first-order latch and pin error
distributions by the charge level in injected transients. For charge levels above
the threshold, the ALU and the watchdog units have the highest probability.
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Figure 5: First-Level and Functional Error Frequency by Charge-Level.
The watchdog unit had high latch error occurrences, but pin errors occurred
only for charges above 6 picocouiombs. The reason is that although an error can
quite easily be latched in the numerous feed-back paths in the watchdog, it does
not propagate to the external pins.
The decoder unit showed a relatively low pin error propagation probability.
The chance of transients below the threshold being latched is generally small,
except for the control unit. In the control unit, the possibility of having latch
errors is high, even at 2 and 3 picocoulombs. The relatively small capacitive
loading of the feed-back paths to the latches in the control circuit explains this
low charge sensitivity.
_z
I
m
U
I
=m !
ilJ
g
i
i
as!
D
M
[]
w
OR;GI_"JF_LPAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
22
t_
|: i.-."
W
W
ALU
tlt
N
0S I1 1.I |_0 4.1 |.0 6,0 11 $ 00
Cov_kn_
05 ID 2.Q }g 40 SJ i.a TO I10 ell,
Ca_li
¢_eqm_ T
E .i,..i. :'7':" '. I | i I !
0| 1.4 |.O ]0 ,10 5.11 _kO 1.0 IlJl 90
D_c_lmr
f ...
m ...... tolm
i0 _ _ - ! ! ! . I 11 I ! I ! I I! _
o 1 ' L_,'::_":'" ............ _..... | I
05 I0 _0 ].Q _1.§ $8 60 ?0 |.0 v_
Mvtdplelw
Ig
I ! 1 I I t | t I._
4' 0.$ IO _Jl }_ 4ill $_ k0 70 | ,,11
30 ...... _'m'
°o.o
..o-
I ..Ib o _ _ ./ ,,
O,J IO _,0 1.0 40 _.0 ILO IJl) |.0 v._
J
ba
=
Figure 6: Error Distribution by Charge Level for Each Functional Unit.
As shown in Figure 6, the multiplexer does not have any latch or pin errors.
This is so because the electrical nodes in the multiplexer unit have high capaci-
tances due to their large number of fanouts.
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CHAPTER 5.
EMPIRICAL MODELS m
Fault propagation usually occurs because errors can be latched and then
migrate to different sections of the chip. A latch error can stay latent and
undetected until it migrates to the pins at a later time. The additional internal
propagation between latches can increase the probability of generating functional
upsets. Thus, a characterization of the latch-to-latch fault propagation patterns is
important. A latch error can either relatch, propagate out to the I/O pins and/or
disappear in each clock cycle.
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5.1. Error Latency
To characterize the latency of transient faults in the circuit, the expected
time (in clock cycles) for an injected transient to migrate to the pins was calcu-
lated. The expected error latency was defined as the mean value of the interval
between the time of fault injection and the time at which a resultant pin error
occurred. Table 6 shows the expected error latency for transients in different
functional units. The expected error latency for transients in the control unit is
the highest. This is because the majority of the pin errors, due to transients in
the control unit, resulted from latch errors. Note that the mean latency for pin
errors in the countdown and the decoder units is less than a clock cycle. All pin
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Table 6: Error Latency
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Mean Error Latency
Functional Unit Clock Cycle
ALU 1.43
Countdown 0.23
Control 4.67
Decoder 0.14
Multiplexer
Watchdog 1.94
errors in these units resulted directly from the injected transients (i.e., no pin
errors in these units were due to latch errors). Thus, the mean latency for the pin
errors in the countdown and the decoder units is simply the signal propagation
delay from the injected location to the external pins. No pin errors were
observed for transients in the multiplexer unit.
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5.2. Error Propagation Model
The propagation of the latch errors in time (in clock cycles) for the control
unit is illustrated in Figure 7. In this figure, the x-axis represents the clock
cycles from the fault injection time and the y-axis represents the total latch error
count for each clock cycle. It can be seen that, given a certain number of latch
errors in the first clock cycle, the number of latch errors degenerates significantly
until the fourth clock cycle. At approximately the fifth clock cycle, the number
of errors rapidly multiplies. Thus, despite the fact that only on a few occasions
w
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Figure 7: Latched Errors in Time.
I
do the latch errors last until the fifth clock cycle, when they do, the number of
errors is large. This is because at this time period, the error signal enters a unit
with a large number of latches and high fan-out, e.g., the ALU registers. After
the sixth cycle, the number of errors degenerates significantly until finally disap-
pearing after the eighth cycle. Thus, the impact of latch errors lasts at the most
up to 8 clock cycles from the time of fault injection.
For analysis purposes, the clock cycles in which the number of latch errors
increases in comparison with previous cycle are defined as "error explosion"
: ?
cycles. Clock cycles in which the number of errors decreases in comparison with
the previous cycle _e defined as "error degeneration" cycles. In Figure 7, an
error explosion occurs in the fifth clock cycle. The chance of functional errors
and pin errors is likely to be maximal during this period of error explosion. In
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the sixth clock cycle (a degeneration cycle), the number of latch errors decreases
to about one-third of the number in the fifth clock cycle.
A model to depict the process of error explosion and degeneration for the
overall system is shown in Figure 8. The model is derived from the measured
data to quantify the dynamics of the error propagation in the system. As seen
from the model, an injected fault either becomes latched (represented by "latch-
error" state) or has no impact on the circuit (represented by "fault-free state").
FAULT
INJECTION
FAULT FREE STATE
PIN ERROR PROB: 0.00
PROB: 0.12
4.57 0.01
STATE
2.79
PIN ERROR
PROB: 0.11
ERROR EXPLOSION STATE
['ROB: 0.11 8.11
0.06 PIN ERROR
PROB: 0.18
0.98
0.02
Figure 8: Error Explosion/Degeneration Model.
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The "explosion" state represents the situation where the number of latch errors in
the current clock cycle is greater than that in the previous cycle. The "degenera-
tion" state represents the opposite scenario, i.e., the number of latch errors
decreases. The value assigned to a state is the average number of latch errors in
that state.
Given a transient fault, there is approximately an 80 percent chance of hav-
ing no impact on the chip. Although the probability of a latch error resulting in
an error explosion is small (0.06), when it does occur, the average number of
latches holding an erroneous value is large (8.11), i.e., although the explosion
event rarely occurs, it is potentially disastrous. The probability of latch errors, in
the explosion state, causing pin errors is higher than that for the degeneration
?
state (0.18 compared to 0.11). This is clearly so because, with the larger number
of latch errors, the probability of error propagation to the pins is increased. After
an explosion, there is a 98 percent chance of latch errors degenerating and then
becoming fault free.
In summary, the probability of sustained explosion is very low with 0.02
probability, i.e,, the Chance of uncontrolled propagation is small, thus the overall
impact of a transient is well contained. Further, if no latch error occurs within 8
clock cycles, no significant damage is likely to happen. Thus, limited ro|l-back
recovery techniques may be very successful.
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5.3. State Transition Model
The foregoing section presented an analysis of the forward propagation in
time of an injected transient. This section examines the question: given a latch
error in a unit, where did it come from? The question of the internal module-to-
module latch error propagation is addressed. It will be seen that the results of
this analysis are useful in identifying several critical aspects of the system. Some
examples include the identification of the critical error propagation paths, the
determination of the module most sensitive to fault propagation and the module
with the highest potential for causing external pin errors.
Figure 9 shows a state transition diagram, based on the measured data, to
quantify the inter-module latch-error propagations. In the figure, the states
represent error conditions in the specified functional units. Note that the model is
of the inverse Markov 7 type. Thus, given a latch error in a specified unit, the
model shows the probabilities that each of the other functional units are the likely
error sources. For example, in the figure, given an external pin error, the proba-
bility of the ALU being the error source is 0.16; the probability of the control
unit being the error source is 0.27.
7A normal forward tmusitiota Markov model _ not be used to describe latch error prt_gation sino_ a latch error can
propagate out to multiple locations at once, Le., a latch error can propagate to both the external pins mad other latches in the circuit.
Thus, an inverse Markov model is used to describe the transition from the error source to error for different states.
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It can be seen from the model that latch errors in the decoder unit do not
propagate to other functional units. All latch errors th_h occurred in this unit are
2
due to the direct effect of the injected transient. This is because the latches in the
decoder unit are well isolated from the inputs of the other units. The probability
of a latch error in the decoder unit propagating to the pins is small (0.01). Thus,
the decoder is not a critical unit from a fault propagation point of view.
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The model addresses several issues raised at the beginning of this section.
For example, the model shows that the critical fault propagation path in the sys-
tem is between the control and the watchdog units. Given a latch error in the
control unit, the probability that it propagated via the watchdog unit is 0.33.
Conversely, the probability of the control unit being the source for a latch error
in the watchdog unit is also high (0.30). In examining the other units, it is seen
that although the one-way propagation probability is high in some cases (e.g.,
0.63 from the watchdog unit to the multiplexer), none has a higher two-way pro-
pagation probability. Therefore, all other factors being equal, the best way of
reducing inter-module error propagations
between the watchdog and the control units.
is to protect the interconnections
Since a significant number of func-
tional errors result from the second- and higher-order latch errors, the system
level impact of providing this protection is expected to be a decrease in the pro°
bability of functional errors.
The model also shows that the module with the highest potential to cause
external pin errors is the watchdog unit. Thirty percent of all pin errors were due
to the latch errors in the watchdog unit. Hence, to reduce the number of pin
error occurrences, the outputs of the watchdog unit should be protected. The
module most sensitive to fault propagation is seen to be the ALU unit. Of all the
functional units, an error occurrence in the ALU is likely to lead to the largest
31
number of latch errors (9.89). Applying internal retry to ALU operations may be
a successful way of reducing the number of latch errors.
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Finally, it is seen that the probability of an injected transient directly causes
pin errors is low. More than 90 percent of the pin errors are due to second- and
higher-order propagation from latch errors. Similarly the probability that an
injected transient directly causing a latch error is also low. Notice that less than
5 percent of the latch errors are due to the direct propagation from the injected
transients. The fact that over 95 percent of latch error occurrences are due to
propagations from other latch errors makes fault propagation a critical issue from
a reliability perspective.
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CHAPTER 6.
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, the effect of transients in a microprocessor-based jet-engine
controller was investigated. A design automation environment to allow the run-
time injection of transients and a graphical analysis facility to visualize the fault
impact on the target system were described. Transients in the range 0.5 to 9.0
picocoulombs were injected and the error data were analyzed to determine the
impact of the resulting latch and pin errors. A number of methods to quantify
the error propagation and the error latency within the chip were developed.
The results show that, given a transient fault, there is approximately an 80
percent chance that it has no impact (latch or pin errors) on the chip. The chance
of a latch error is over 20 percent while that of a pin error is approximately 12
percent. Only 25 percent of the latch errors propagated past one clock cycle,
although each such propagation resulted, on the average, in about 15 latch and 9
pin errors. More than 40 percent of the pin errors were due to multistep latch-
error propagations. Approximately 10 percent of the transients caused the
erroneous behavior of the microprocessor's control functions (i.e., functional
errors).
In order to quantify the dynamics of the error propagation in the system, a
model to depict the process of error explosion and degeneration of latch errors in
33
the overall system was derived from the measureddata. The model showed that
although the probability of a latch error resulting in an error explosion was very
small (0.06), when it did occur, the averagenumber of latches holding erroneous
values was large (8.11), i.e., although _e explosio n event rarely occurs, it is
potentially disastrous. The probability of sustained error explosion was also very
low (0.02), i.e., the chance of uncontrolled error propagation was small. Thus,
the overall impact of a transient was well contained. Further, if no latch error
occurred within 8 clock cycles, there was no significant damage to the micropro-
cessor functions. Thus, limited roll-back recovery techniques which can keep
track of the machine state for up to 8 clock cycles may be very successful.
A state transition model was also derived from the measured data to describe
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the error propagation characteristics within the chip and to quantify the impact of
transients on the external environment. The model was used to identify and iso-
late the critical fault propagation paths, the module most sensitive to fault propa-
gation and the module with the highest potential of causing external pin errors.
The fault propagation path between the control unit and the watchdog unit was
seen to be the most critical, indicating thereby that an increase in the fault toler-
ance of this link may significantly improve the system dependability. The watch-
dog unit was seen to have the highest potential for causing external pin errors.
Of all the functional units, an error occurrence in the ALU is likely to lead to the
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wlargest number of latch errors (9.89).
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Protection of the ALU through retry was
therefore suggested to reduce the impact of the latch errors.
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